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Abstract 
Richard Rorty’s navigation of the pitfalls of the cosmopolitan-communitarian debate, concern with 
human suffering, recognition of the contingency of communal identities and relationships, and his 
endorsement of liberal societies, by definition inclusive and always in search of a greater justice, make it 
appear as though his thought can guide us towards greater concern for the world's poor. However, this 
article questions the progressive potential of Rorty’s thought. Obstacles to such (global) moral progress 
include Rorty’s unquestioned statism and his focus on internal outsiders who are suffering and/or 
oppressed, instead of external outsiders beyond national borders; his insistence on a public-private split 
that legitimises social indifference, coupled with a narrow understanding of responsibility; the 
undemandingness of his liberalism; and his emphasis on the excluding notion of ‘solidarity’, as 
prerequisite for moral concern. However, continuous Rortian ‘sentimental education’ can lessen the 
objectification of and indifference to the global poor. 
 
 
Introduction 
In the field of international relations, the disagreement over the extent of our responsibility to alleviate the 
suffering of extremely poor people beyond our borders is a central issue in the cosmopolitan-
communitarian debate. Although Richard Rorty never addresses the matter of our responsibility for 
extremely poor outsiders in a direct and sustained manner, and resents that the matter of our responsibility 
for others has been framed as ‘the cosmopolitan-communitarian debate’ (2001, p. 201), his work 
navigates many of the pitfalls and tensions of this debate. 
Rorty steers through some of the tensions of the cosmopolitan-communitarian debate in the following 
ways.1  
First, while for cosmopolitans the principles of justice are universal and for communitarians they are 
culturally specific, Rorty recognises the cultural and historical contingency of the (Western) notion of 
human rights, whilst simultaneously endorsing such a human rights culture as morally superior based on 
the desirability thereof and not because the universal moral legitimacy of human rights can be proved by 
reference to our shared rationality or the moral law within us. 
Second, while for cosmopolitans the moral identity an individual should aspire to should be based on 
impartial principles, communitarians think that the individual's moral identity inescapably reflects his 
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socio-cultural context, a factual claim communitarians also endorse normatively. Although for Rorty there 
is no impartial position from which to judge moral principles, he is sensitive to the dangers inherent in 
being too entrenched in the forms of life of one's community and foresees consequences such as 
intolerance, cruelty and indifference resulting from an uncritical celebration of one's social situatedness 
(1991b, p. 195). Rorty recognises the ‘contingency’ of our situatedness and deems ‘irony’ an appropriate 
attitude towards our acculturation and its inevitable socio-political blindnesses. 
Third, whereas cosmopolitans view humans as equal ‘in some fundamental sense’ (Barry, 1998, p. 146), 
communitarians privilege deeply fellow members of their community, consequently often neglecting the 
dire needs of outsiders. Rorty appears to side with communitarians given his view that moral concern is a 
matter of we-feeling and pointing out that someone should be helped because he is a human being is ‘a 
weak, unconvincing explanation of a generous action’ (1989, p. 191), but guards against the negative 
aspects of communitarian thought by advocating the creation of solidarity with people once thought of as 
outsiders. 
Moreover, Rorty combines the aforementioned theoretical subtleties with a deep concern for the suffering 
of outsiders. In a world where thousands die daily from poverty-related causes, Rorty’s view of ‘moral 
progress as a matter of increasing sensitivity, increasing responsiveness to the needs of a larger and larger 
variety of people and things’ contains a promise of hope for outsiders suffering amid our disregard (1999, 
p. 81, emphasis in original). 
This article elaborates and questions the moral progressiveness of Rorty’s thought against a background 
of tremendous global poverty, slow progress in alleviating it, and widespread indifference to poverty-
related suffering. While some of the criticism voiced here can be found elsewhere, this article sets the 
criticism within the context of normative international relations theory in general and the cosmopolitan-
communitarian debate more specifically (cf. Festenstein and Thompson, 2001; Geras, 1995; Guignon and 
Hiley, 2003; Gutting, 1999; Malachowksi, 1990; 2002a; 2002b)2.  
First, I shall consider Rorty’s emphasis on the contingent acculturation of the self, and the attitude he 
proposes we adopt in the face thereof. Second, I shall present Rorty’s understanding of liberal society. 
Consideration of these two aspects will provide us with some insight as to how Rorty sees the blinkers 
associated with communal belonging to be partially lifted, at both individual and societal levels. The 
discussion will then assume a more critical direction by indicating those aspects of Rorty’s thought that 
constrain his morally progressive aspirations. Elements in Rorty’s approach that militate against an 
adoption of greater responsibility for other people will be presented through discussions of his view of 
institutions; the public-private split he insists upon; the continued sovereignty of the liberal self; and a 
questioning of his notion of solidarity. 
 
The contingent self 
According to Rorty, we human beings cannot help being ‘accultured’ as we are. The fact that we were 
born at a certain time and place makes certain ways of being seem natural, possible, and/or good to us, 
whereas other choices and forms of life seem foreign or unavailable to us. Insofar as we are concerned 
with the way we should live, there is no universal ‘skyhook’ or ‘God's-eye point of view’ from which to 
judge others or ourselves. Instead, ‘we have to start from where we are’ (1989, p. 198), ‘from the 
communities with which we presently identify’ (1991b, p. 202). 
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In awareness of the dangers (and undesirability) of being too enamoured with one's coincidental forms of 
life, Rorty sketches a type of person, the ‘liberal ironist’, who thinks ‘that cruelty is the worst thing we 
do’3 (the liberal part) and who ‘faces up to contingency of his or her own most central beliefs and desires’ 
(the ironist part). Liberal ironists are unable to say why we should not be cruel, or when the oft-
conflicting imperatives of either self-creation or social justice should prevail (1989, p. xv). The liberal 
ironist is also unable to give a general answer about when we may favour members of our group over 
random other people (1989, p. xv). 
Ironists recognise the contingency of their identities and social vocabularies, along with the social 
relationships that accompany these. Irony involves being concerned that one may have ‘been initiated into 
the wrong tribe, taught to play the wrong language game’; that one’s present vocabulary/ies does/do not 
provide one with the tools to get rid of these doubts; and that one does not think of the vocabularies one is 
presently using as being closer to ‘reality’ than any others, but merely newer (1989, pp. 73–75). Ironists 
fear being ‘stuck in the vocabulary in which they were brought up’ and knowing only ‘the people in their 
own neighbourhood’, so they try to acquaint themselves with lives and people strange to them (1989, p. 
80). 
Insofar as irony opens up the possibilities of social change, such potential stems from an ‘awareness of 
the power of redescription’ (1989, p. 89). Though most of us resent being redescribed and having the 
arbitrariness of our present beliefs and values shown up, such redescription serves an important function. 
Redescription makes us aware of others we may (unknowingly) have been cruel to, or that those people 
who we have thought of as strange (if we even gave them any thought at all), are in fact much like us. 
Ironic redescription destabilises fixed perceptions of, and relationships between, us and others, thereby 
paving the way for the reconstitution of solidarities. For Rorty, solidarity with others is synonymous with 
their inclusion in the scope of our moral concern. 
As a liberal, Rorty insists on a stark separation between the private and the public, and sees no reason 
why pursuits in one sphere of life should predominate over (or necessarily be related to) pursuits in the 
other (1989, p. 83, p. 194; 1991a, p. 197). In private, people can seek to work out ‘a new private final 
vocabulary’ (1989, p. 143), that is a way to view ‘their past which is incommensurable with all the ways 
in which the past has described itself … Private autonomy can be achieved by redescribing one's past in a 
way which had not occurred to the past’ (1989, p. 101), because relying on other people's description of 
oneself would amount to the ‘horror of finding oneself only to be a copy or a replica’ (Bloom, cited in 
Rorty, 1989, p. 29). 
The private is the realm where we pursue personal perfection and deal with our ‘aloneness’ (1991b, p. 
13). Private, ironist thinking is not necessarily ‘destructive of social hope’ but ‘largely irrelevant to public 
life and to political questions’ (1989, p. 83). A whole culture should and could not be ironist. Irony is only 
reactive—it needs everyday ‘common sense’ against which to position itself (1989, p. 87). Ironism fails to 
‘empower’ (1989, p. 91). In Rorty’s view, irony bears no necessary directional relation to social change. 
The ironist ‘cannot claim that adopting her redescription of yourself or your situation makes you better 
able to conquer the forces which are marshalled against you’ (1989). Rather, ‘poetic, artistic, 
philosophical, scientific, or political progress results from the accidental coincidence of a private 
obsession with a public need’ (1989, p. 37, emphasis added). 
When Rorty writes that the liberal ironist ‘needs’ both new private and public final vocabularies, he still 
does not think of these as connected. Private vocabularies are for seeking self-perfection, whereas new 
public vocabularies are there to help us become more aware of others. Tension between the demands of 
the public and those of the private only arise when we think in terms of a ‘comprehensive philosophical 
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outlook [that] would let us hold self-creation and justice, private perfection and human solidarity in a 
single vision’ (1989, p. xiv). And while one need not unite the two sides in theory, in everyday life there 
are practical consequences for reifying such a theoretical division (see below). 
The ironist flourishes and is most comfortable in a liberal society, where plurality is accepted and her 
idiosyncratic views and choices can be expressed and pursued. Although the liberal ironist has given up 
on grounding democracy philosophically, she keeps watch over democracy, ‘making sure she notices 
suffering when it occurs’ (1989, p. 93). There is a mutually sustaining relationship between redescribers 
such as ironists (but also anthropologists, novelists, poets, journalists, etc.) and the liberal society they 
live in. 
 
Liberal society 
As a pragmatist, Rorty blurs the line between what is morally wrong and practically inadvisable (1989, p. 
32). As a ‘postmodern bourgeois liberal’, Rorty deems it unnecessary and misguided to seek foundations 
for liberal values and principles, justice being the ‘first virtue’ of liberal societies (1991b, pp. 197–202). 
As justice becomes entrenched as the first virtue, the need to legitimise its priority fades and the practical 
desirability of living in such a society justifies itself (1991b, p. 184, p. 209). The Kantianism of the past 
has served to create and justify the liberal democracies of today. However, Kantianism has been 
discredited enough for it to no longer serve as philosophical justification of liberalism. The consequence 
of this is not the abandonment of liberalism, but rather the abandonment of ‘the traditional Kantian 
buttresses, buttresses which include an account of “rationality” and “morality” as transcultural and 
historical’ (1991b, p. 198). Liberal societies have reached a point where ‘loyalty to itself is morality 
enough, and that such loyalty no longer needs ahistorical backup’ (1991b, p. 199), but rather an improved 
articulation of the principles according to which liberal society functions (1989, p. 52). And rather than 
still insisting on ‘the revolutionary rhetoric of emancipation and unmasking’, pragmatists like Rorty 
propose an incremental approach based on ‘rhetoric about increased tolerance and decreased suffering’ 
(1991b, p. 213). 
Rorty invokes the development of a human rights culture to strengthen his claim that we should give up 
looking for philosophical foundations to the idea that we should treat others better (1998c, pp. 167–185)4.  
Although Rorty rejects the need for an ahistorical or philosophical grounding of human rights, he also 
dismisses those who accuse him of relativism. For these critics, it appears that Rorty’s position is 
‘incompatible with the fact that our human rights culture is morally superior to other cultures’. In 
response, Rorty ‘quite agrees that ours is morally superior, but [does] not think that this superiority counts 
in favour of the existence of a universal human nature’ (1998c, p. 170), but is based on the comparative 
desirability of living in a liberal society (1991b, p. 29). So, for him, ‘to say that certain people have 
certain rights is merely to say that we should treat them in certain ways. It is not to give a reason for 
treating them in those ways’ (1991b, p. 32). 
Rorty’s endorsement of liberal society should be seen against the undesirable consequences of not being 
liberal, which entail a social inability and unwillingness to question the treatment of outsiders and a 
dispositional hardening of social and historical contingency at the expense of others. Rorty fears that ‘it is 
hard to be both enchanted with one version of the world and tolerant of all others’ (1991b, p. 195). Such 
enchantment and/or self-certainty can lead to the vicious and deliberate dehumanisation of others (1998c, 
pp. 167–169), or the inability to see the cruelties, inequalities and oppression present in our institutions 
(1991b, pp. 203–210), or our personal and private cruelties (1989, pp. 141–168). Fortunately, 
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characteristic of liberal society is ‘the tradition … that the human stranger from whom all dignity has 
been stripped is to be taken in, to be reclothed with dignity’ (1991b, p. 202). 
What Rorty sees lacking in intolerant and cruel societies, is ‘security and sympathy’ (1998c, p. 180). 
Security refers to not having one's survival depend upon which group one person belongs to. Security and 
tolerance for other groups depend on a certain level of material wellbeing, since: 
our loyalty to … larger groups will, however, weaken, or even vanish altogether, when things get 
really tough. Then people whom we once thought of as like ourselves will be excluded. Sharing 
food with impoverished people down the street is natural and right in normal times, but perhaps 
not in a famine, when doing so dismounts to disloyalty to one's family. The tougher things get, 
the more ties of loyalty to those near at hand tighten, and the more those to everyone else slacken 
(1998b, p. 45). 
Sympathy involves the ability to see strange people as similar to us. Sympathy for others does not require 
the premise that we are all rational (and therefore similar). Instead, it is better to tell a ‘long, sad, 
sentimental story’, for such stories have steadily ‘induced us, the rich, safe, powerful people to tolerate 
and even to cherish powerless people—people whose appearance or habits or beliefs at first seemed an 
insult to our own moral identities, our sense of the limits of permissible human variation’ (1998c, p. 184). 
Liberal societies pride themselves on their tolerance for plurality. Liberals try to shake off the ‘curse’ of 
ethnocentrism (i.e. the inevitable initial myopia of having to ‘start from where we are’) through a 
commitment to ‘creating an ever larger and more variegated ethnos’ (1989, p. 198). Positive 
characteristics of liberal society include the desire to increase ‘the freedom and openness of encounters’ 
(1991b, p. 2) and ‘constantly adding on more windows, constantly enlarging its sympathies’ (1991b, p. 
204). In the aspiration to a better society, conflict occurs only through words and not through force—
‘poets and revolutionaries’ are empowered to ‘make life harder for others only by words, and not deeds’ 
(1989, p. 60). 
Expanders of sympathy are by definition found in and deemed essential to liberal societies. ‘Connoisseurs 
of diversity’ open our eyes to injustice and cruelty and bring excluded others into our group, creating 
sympathy and solidarity with strange people (1991b, p. 206). For Rorty, we come to sympathise with 
others when we recognise them as being like ourselves and incorporate them into our group. ‘Solidarity is 
not discovered by reflection but created … by the imaginative ability to see strange people as fellow 
sufferers’ (1989, p. xvi). Solidarity has to be created ‘out of little pieces, rather than found already 
waiting, in the form of an ur-language which all of us recognise when we hear it’ (1989, p. 94). 
 
In contrast to cosmopolitan universalist hope, solidarity is exclusionary, as, according to Rorty, ‘our sense 
of solidarity is strongest when those with whom solidarity is expressed are thought of as ‘one of us’, 
where ‘us’ means something smaller and more local than the human race’ (1989, p. 191). While universal 
solidarity remains a Rortian hope, he deems it unlikely to occur (2001, p. 201). The communitarian in 
Rorty makes him doubt the extent to which we can loosen ourselves from our vocabularies and social ties, 
as for him we either ‘attach a special privilege to our own community, or we pretend an impossible 
tolerance for every other group’ (1991b, p. 29). Still, Rorty remains aware of its dangers, asking whether 
‘what we have recently gained in solidarity cost us our ability to listen to outsiders who are suffering?’ 
(1991b, p. 13). Rather than requiring deep commitment to and identification with a community, Rorty 
displays his affinity to Rawls by stating that virtually all that is needed to hold liberal societies together 
‘is a consensus that the point of social organisation is to let everybody have a chance at self-creation to 
6 
 
the best of his or her abilities, and that goal requires, besides peace and wealth, the standard “bourgeois 
freedoms”’ (1991b, p. 13). 
What are some of the strategies Rorty proposes to bring about greater sensitivity to cruelty and 
oppression? Political action and resistance are important because social change can only occur where 
cultural ‘splits’ have appeared. ‘We can only hope to transcend our acculturation if our culture contains 
(or, thanks to disruptions from outside or internal revolt, comes to contain) splits which supply toeholds 
for new initiatives’ (1991b, p. 13). Within the fissures of a cracked open culture, we can be exposed to the 
cruelties and injustices others or ourselves have been committing. Apart from political campaigning and 
protest, our inadequate treatment of others can also be demonstrated through ‘the novel, the movie, and 
the TV programme [which] have, gradually but steadily, replaced the sermon and the treatise as the 
principal vehicles of moral change and progress’ (1989, p. xvi). What is then needed are more agents 
bringing us such exposures, continuously revealing the contingency and cruelties of our worlds. This need 
not lead to a feeling of uprootedness, but can instead enable non-teleological moral progress. 
 
Inhibited responsibility and concern 
 
Institutions 
Rorty identifies two aspects of justice. The first dimension is of justice as static and objectifying. Here, a 
‘society built around procedural justice’ does not want its ‘agents of justice’, its ‘guardians of 
universality’, to give too much thought to the ‘sentimental’ stories of those to whom they apply their 
objective rules. When sentencing the war criminal to death, for example, this task is made easier when we 
did not watch him grow up, did not travel ‘the road he had travelled’, for otherwise ‘we might have had 
difficulty reconciling the demands of love and justice. But it is well for society that in most cases our 
ignorance permits us to avoid this dilemma. Most of the time justice has to be enough’ (1991b, pp. 205–
206). Rorty here endorses an extreme objectification of humans so as to enable justice. The war criminal 
is reduced to his evil deeds. Justice so understood is a wilful suppression of the human features that might 
endear the war criminal to us somewhat. However, in the same article there is a second view of justice as 
malleable and sensitive to diversity, expanding the stark objectification mentioned above. For example, 
twentieth-century America was able to include Indians after ‘the vast majority of nineteenth-century 
Americans took no more notice of them than they did of criminal psychopaths or village idiots’. The 
gradual recognition and inclusion of strange people (such as American Indians) has been helped along by 
‘connoisseurs of diversity’ or ‘agents of love’ (1991b, p. 206). Rorty is here expounding his usual view of 
liberal democracy as constantly extending its ‘sympathies’ (1991b, p. 204). Rorty highlights the tension 
between the need for ‘objective’ and impersonal justice and a form of justice more sensitive to the 
uniqueness of each person's situation, but does not further explore answers to the appropriate relation 
between these two senses of justice. It is in the domain of global justice, however, that Rorty is most 
silent about the impersonal rules, norms and principles that shape transnational interaction and its 
consequences. 
Rorty’s talk of creating solidarity with strange other people and expanding our sympathies suggests that 
he has groups both within and beyond state boundaries in mind. However, when Rorty speaks of 
inclusion into our group, his examples refer only to the inclusion of internal outsiders. Inclusion is 
confined to the subjects of national institutions. Rorty does not question the state boundaries or 
sovereignty principles that keep external outsiders out. He sees liberal institutions as containing the 
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elements of their own improvement, but beyond that he does not concern himself much with the character 
of these institutions (2001, p. 201). He does, through a quote from Orwell, namely that the ‘democratic 
vistas seem to end in barbed wire’, recognise the problematic character of state sovereignty (1989, p. 86). 
However, Rorty does not concern himself with cosmopolitan contributions about the changing character 
of citizenship, nor does he mention international institutions. Admittedly, one is criticising a liberal for 
being a liberal when not questioning the moral status of state boundaries (Cochran, 1996, p. 30). But 
despite Rorty’s insistence that we don't need a ‘critique of liberal society’ (1996, p. 45), the deep 
involvement of liberal societies in cruel wars, colonialism, support for oppressive and cruel regimes, deep 
and unapologetic complicity in the human rights abuses in Africa, Central and South America during 
recent decades; the tightening of immigration legislation; the imposition of harsh economic terms on poor 
countries through proxies such as the World Bank, IMF and the WTO; allowing thousands of daily 
poverty-related deaths amid their bounty; etc., foist a ‘critique of liberal society’ upon Rorty whether he 
likes it or not. Rorty ignores the fact that liberal regimes don't just act inwardly, but also act beyond their 
borders. 
Though cruelty and degradation are still prevalent in rich democracies, the suffering experienced by the 
poor outside these countries is more urgent and life-threatening. So, the problem in international relations 
lies less in bringing the excluded and downtrodden within the borders of the rich democracies into the 
realm of moral concern (though this is no doubt also important), but more with expanding our sympathy 
for those outside (assuming some trade-off) and breaking through nationally focused circles of moral 
concern. Rorty is of course aware that the rich democracies are islands in oceans of misery and 
deprivation, but evades the issue (1998b, p. 46). That is strange for a pragmatist who is able to prefer a 
certain national political system based on a simple comparison (1991b, p. 29). Why not compare a world 
where there is much starvation in the Third World and free public library access and widely available 
liberal arts education in the First World, with a world where there is less starvation but also less money 
for public libraries? (1998b, p. 46)5. This is indeed a dilemma for a global original position. To my mind, 
favouring the former would show a lack of irony about the contingent privilege of the few, a hardening of 
a positional fluke into a dispositional preference. So while Rorty recognises that certain rich communities 
are ‘island[s] in time, surrounded by misery, tyranny and chaos’ (1989, p. 86), he does not seriously face 
up to the contingent privilege of their members. 
 
The public-private split 
Another factor in Rorty’s writing that inhibits greater concern for outsiders is his firm separation of the 
public and the private, neither realm being more important than the other. Self-perfection is pursued in the 
private sphere, where the individual struggles to invent a new description of herself, independent of those 
of other people (1989, p. 28). But is successful self-(re)creation as available and socially inconsequential 
as Rorty thinks? Nietzsche, Heidegger and Derrida have certainly created unique private vocabularies and 
new metaphors, but these are still presented in terms of philosophical discourse and language itself, 
neither of which can entirely be freed from its social character. These ‘strong makers’ use ‘words as they 
have never before been used’ (1989, p. 28), yet many of the words remain the same. Their writings 
certainly resist easy understanding, but we can still read and partially understand their work. How original 
is Derrida when we recognise his roots in Nietzsche and Heidegger?6. Rorty recognises this problem. 
Though ‘metaphors are unfamiliar uses of old words…such uses are possible only against the background 
of other old words being used in familiar ways. A language which is all metaphor would be a language 
which had no use, hence not a language but just babble’ (1989, p. 41). 
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Rorty thinks that private vocabularies developed by ironists are ‘irrelevant’ to public life, but occasionally 
he seems ambivalent about the absoluteness of the public-private distinction, recognises its fuzziness and 
stresses the theoretical usefulness of this distinction instead (1989, p. 83; 2001, p. 202). Rorty views these 
writers as only helping us become ‘autonomous’, and as not saying much about our cruelty to others 
(1989, p. 141). Despite the absence of any necessary link to social progress, new vocabularies created by 
writers such as Nietzsche and Heidegger can be socially useful for their new articulations of the human 
situation. Although many of Nietzsche's battles were with himself (i.e. private), he expanded our sense of 
being human. Nietzsche did not seek to reduce cruelty, but after reading him we had more empathy, if not 
necessarily sympathy. Many of the strange new metaphors created by ironist writers find their way into 
greater literalness and common usage. Although these terms are soon vulgarised (1989, p. 126), they do 
provide us with more and newer ways of describing the human condition, expanding our imaginations, 
helping us overcome ‘a certain blindness in human beings’ (William James, cited in Rorty, 1989, p. 38). 
The strong maker cannot claim more than ‘that his differences from the past, inevitably minor and 
marginal as they are, will nevertheless be carried over into the future—that his metaphoric redescriptions 
of small parts of the past will be among the future's stock of literal truths’ (1989, p. 42). But, for these 
reformulations to be socially useful, even if they were never intended to be, the inadvertent 
correspondence of a private expression with a public need is required (1989, p. 37). 
Rorty insists upon the absolute sanctity of the private, permitting someone to think what he wants in 
private, as long as it does not harm anyone else. ‘For my private purposes, I may redescribe you and 
everybody else in terms which have nothing to do with my attitude toward your actual or possible 
suffering. My private purposes, and the part of my final vocabulary which is not relevant to my public 
actions, are none of your business’ (1989, p. 91). However, Rorty mitigates the harshness of this 
statement in the next sentence by running irony with liberalism: ‘But as I am a liberal, the part of my final 
vocabulary which is relevant to such actions requires me to become aware of all the ways in which other 
human beings whom I might act upon can be humiliated’ (1989, pp. 91–92). Rorty often dampens charges 
against the ironist for being asocial and elitist by mentioning ironism and liberalism together (1989, p. xv, 
pp. 91–92), and giving his definition of a liberal a strong element of social concern to offset asocial irony. 
Furthermore, for Rorty there is no necessary link between a person's public and private sides. Rorty uses 
Heidegger's involvement with the Nazis as a case in point. Heidegger, the great philosopher, tells us much 
about how to seek private perfection, and in this regard strikes us as ‘an immensely sympathetic figure’ 
(1989, p. 120). Heidegger, the public figure, the ‘Schwarzwald redneck’, on the other hand, was 
‘resentful, petty, squint-eyed, obsessive—and at his occasional worst … cruel’ (1989, p. 111, p. 120). 
However, Rorty sees Heidegger's public and private lives as unrelated—it should be unimportant to us 
‘whether these writers managed to live up to their own self-images’ (1989, p. 79). Rorty wants us to stop 
wondering about one of the great puzzles of the twentieth century, namely how one of the greatest 
philosophical minds could have been involved with the Nazis and his subsequent silence about the 
Holocaust. While people, such as Paul Celan, hoped and waited for the ‘thinking man's coming word in 
the heart’ (from the poem ‘Todtnauberg’ by Paul Celan, 1995, p. 301), Rorty thinks Heidegger justified in 
his silence. Even if we disregard Heidegger's association with the Nazis, we have to wonder if it were not 
because of people like Heidegger feeling justified in privately obsessing over their own being in a hut at 
Todtnauberg, that the social indifference that enabled the decimation of the Jews was possible. How could 
anyone ‘be content to treat the demands of self-creation and of human solidarity as equally valid’, during, 
for example the Nazi period? (1989, p. xv). Rorty is steadfast in his liberal legitimation of the private and 
his refusal to question the sovereignty of being. 
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Indifference permits too many injustices that are not necessarily anyone's doing. Rorty thinks that as long 
as someone did nothing wrong, he is not responsible. Again, only a few Germans actively killed Jews, but 
the turning away from the problem, wanting to be left alone, making it someone else's problem, created 
the conditions for horror. Our ‘legitimate’, private self-absorption creates the conditions in which 
thousands die daily from preventable, poverty-related causes, a catastrophe to which most of us are 
indifferent. Statements such as that the ‘desire to be autonomous is not relevant to the liberal's desire to 
avoid cruelty and pain’ (1989, p. 65), and ‘our responsibilities to others constitute only the public side of 
our lives’ (1989, p. 194, emphasis in original), justify indifference through a reification of the theoretical 
public-private split, especially when there is no ‘automatic priority’ for public responsibilities over the 
imperatives of the private (1989, p. 194). In our complex (global) society there are many things that cause 
suffering, but that are no one in particular's fault. The negative consequences of restricting our 
responsibilities to others to the public side of our lives, is exacerbated by Rorty’s vision for a small public 
sphere and a large private sphere (1989, p. 100), which goes in the direction of political disengagement, 
which he criticises in others. 
 
The liberal individual 
Liberals, such as Rorty, are justified in desiring a private sphere protected against arbitrary and/or 
oppressive invasions by the state or non-state agents as broadly understood in law. The undesirable 
character of these entries of the state into the private sphere notwithstanding, by claiming such sanctity 
for the private, Rorty is delegitimising and undermining demands that would destabilise the centrality of 
the private (liberal) self in its isolated self-regard and enable the needs of others to become more pertinent 
than they presently are. It is important for the liberal to ‘notice’ suffering, to think that ‘cruelty is the 
worst thing we do’, but we are left with no way of persuading the person who observes such a state of 
affairs to actually do something. 
Apart from the potential for self-satisfied indifference that results from a real-life reification of the 
theoretically divided public and private, the inaction present in Rorty’s liberalism further constrains the 
improvement of society for the sake of the others. Consider his definition of a liberal as someone who 
‘thinks cruelty is the worst thing we do’ (1989, p. xv, emphasis added) and his contention that what 
‘matters for the liberal ironist is not finding [a reason to care about suffering] but making sure she notices 
suffering when it occurs’ (1989, p. 93, emphasis in original). Note that Rorty does not, for instance, 
define a liberal as someone who tries to prevent cruelty. How are we to persuade the observer to actually 
do something to alleviate suffering? At times, Rorty forgets the human activity and engagement behind 
self-questioning and self-improving liberal institutions. Such undemandingness echoes Rawls who 
acknowledges that ‘we are to assist in the establishment of just arrangements when they do not exist, at 
least when this can be done with little cost to ourselves’ (Rawls, 1999, p. 294, emphasis added). 
Elsewhere, however, Rorty advocates the creation of groups seeking to express and exercise a fuller 
personhood and recognises that they may face ‘ruthless suppression’ (1998c, p. 223). However, Rorty 
does not clarify the liberal's role in helping others realise a fuller personhood.7  One should grant that the 
institutions of a liberal society create the conditions in which social and moral progress can occur, but 
action remains necessary. In non-liberal societies the costs of campaigning for a more humane society are 
even higher (1989, p. 63, fn. 21). 
Although Rorty points out the contingency of the identity of the self, he is unable to push this contingency 
to the point where one’s being in itself becomes problematic, given Rorty’s insistence on the inviolability 
of the private. Rorty recognises the contingency of identity, but ignores the contingency of existence. In 
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fact, he reinforces and justifies it. Rorty still thinks of letting ‘citizens be as privatistic, “irrationalist”, and 
aestheticist as they please as long as they do it in their own time—causing no harm to others and using no 
resources needed by those less advantaged’ as unproblematic (1989, p. xiv). Although Rorty occasionally 
acknowledges that there are ‘tendencies to cruelty inherent in searches for autonomy’ (1989, p. 144), he 
remains unrepentant. 
 
 
Questioning solidarity 
As mentioned, Rorty suggests that redescription lays the foundations for expanding sympathy with 
strange other people, and subsequent to that, reconstituted ties of solidarity. While agreeing on the 
importance of redescription for moral and social progress, there are problems related to who Rorty 
identifies as targets for rediscription and with the notion of solidarity itself. I will suggest that we move 
away from the exclusion inherent in solidarity and focus on a prior process, sentimental education. 
Opening up excluding societies through redescription enables the creation of solidarity with other groups. 
Without recourse to a universal vocabulary proclaiming the solidarity of all humans, many groups will 
necessarily be excluded from solidarity (1989, p. 88). Our common humanity is a weak reason for helping 
someone. A more forceful reason would be because someone is ‘one of us’. For Rorty, moral dilemmas 
are ‘reflections of the fact that most of us identify with a number of different communities and are equally 
reluctant to marginalise ourselves in relation to any of them’ (1991b, p. 201). The balance between 
various conflicting identifications can be altered through the redescriptive potential of art, education, 
literature, television, journalism, etc. Yet, and here lies my concern, we, the materially comfortable, need 
to think of the people who we come to see as like ourselves and subsequently include into our ‘we’. Are 
our imaginations not usually opened to groups and persons we are already somewhat aware of, more 
rounded characters that already have some power of self-expression, of forcing us to listen, of creating 
toeholds from whence our public imaginations and policies can be expanded? To generalise, Americans 
are most likely to see other Westerners as being like them, an (unfortunate) affirmation of Huntington's 
assessment (Huntington, 1998). But this leaves the problem of life-threatening poverty at the international 
level largely unaltered: those who are most able to assist in alleviating global poverty continue to feel 
closest to those who need their help the least. 
Making Rorty speak of the world's extremely poor, far removed from Western imaginations and 
solidarity, he writes, ‘people who are suffering do not have much in the way of language. That is why 
there is no such thing as the “voice of the oppressed” … So the job of putting their situation into language 
is going to have to be done for them by somebody else’ (1989, p. 94). However, we tend to speak for 
those who are already able to demand justice from us, with whose fate we are already concerned, who can 
make us pay for our disregard, and who already have a foothold in our imaginations and sympathies. In 
Rorty’s understanding, we become aware of our responsibility to others as ‘fellow sufferers’ to the extent 
that their needs fit in with our conceptions of need (1989, p. xvi). However, the extremely poor seem 
silent to us: expressions and explanations of their need, and simply what it is like to be them, are virtually 
inaudible to our ears and largely absent from our lives. Compared to those closer to us, we do not have as 
many categories and words to articulate their suffering. The weakest and most marginal are also the least 
able to gain our understanding and a foothold in our imaginations. The problem for global justice then 
becomes: how are we to act upon our responsibilities to others without falling into the trap of expanding 
our sympathies with relatively powerful groups at the expense of weaker groups? That is, how does one 
create greater ‘solidarity’ with groups one is less likely to create it with? 
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The cosmopolitan solution is to invoke justice as impartiality, or other universalist standards, in order to 
achieve greater consideration for the most marginal. But this strategy is not available according to Rorty. 
He writes: 
We want moral progress to burst up from below, rather than waiting patiently upon 
condescension from the top. The residual popularity of Kantian ideas of ‘unconditional moral 
obligation’—obligation imposed by deep ahistorical noncontingent forces—seems to me almost 
entirely based on our abhorrence of the idea that the people on top hold the future in their hands, 
that everything depends on them, that there is nothing more powerful to which we can appeal 
against them. Like everyone else, I too would prefer a bottom-up way of achieving utopia, a 
quick reversal of fortune that will make the last first. But I do not think this is how utopia will in 
fact come into being (1998c, p. 182). 
As long as our view and understanding of, and exposure to, others remain stable, the balance of our 
various commitments and responsibilities will stay the same and as things stand, equally little hope will 
remain for the most excluded, since they will stay so strange to us that we will not acquire much more of 
an ability to understand and imagine their lives. How do we then direct our concern to the neediest? 
Liberal ironic softening, questioning and redescription of personal vocabularies are a start, since these 
destabilise the categories, priorities and directions of present responsibilities. But how do we achieve 
greater recognition of the lives and needs of those most unlikely to be included into ‘our’ group? Part of 
the answer lies in discarding Rorty’s ambitious notion of solidarity and stressing an earlier moment in the 
process of expanding solidarity, namely merely increasing sympathy through sentimental education. 
Apart from tending to exclude those most in need of our help, there are further problems with the notion 
of ‘solidarity’. As mentioned, Rorty ignores the deeply problematic character of national borders, despite 
the fact that state boundaries are fundamental barriers to solidarity between ‘strange people’ and us. Can 
relations between people on the other side of the world and us be described as solidarity in any deep sense 
of the term? Further, Rorty does not think of solidarity as permanent, since when times are tough it seems 
only natural that we contract our beneficence to narrower circles (1998b, p. 45). While this seems a 
reasonable description of social actuality, the problem then becomes how to hold off this seemingly 
‘natural’ return to our narrower circles. One part of the answer is through a continuous awareness of the 
contingency of our social associations and commitments. Another is through a continued sentimental 
education to make us aware of suffering and need outside our narrower circle, fighting off the 
objectification of outsiders to assuage our guilt for denying them our help. 
There is a tension in Rorty’s attempt to get us to see strange people as more like us and the expansion of 
our moral vocabularies and scopes. On the one hand, Rorty seems to be saying that in order for solidarity 
to develop we need to notice our similarities with strange people (1989, p. 196; 1991b, p. 23). On the 
other hand, sentimental education, that is, becoming more open to others and viewing them in a fuller 
personhood, suggests a recognition, acknowledgement and acceptance of their difference. But, and here 
lies the opposition, a view of moral progress as increasingly identifying with strange people cannot be 
both expandingly open to different others and only able to identify with others insofar as they are like us. 
How would we then become accustomed to their strangeness? We would also have to change. Rorty 
recognises such change through the use of terms such as ‘moral progress’, ‘progress of sentiments’ and 
‘enlarging our sympathies’ (1998c, p. 185; 1991b, p. 204). Fortunately, the assimilationist element is only 
necessary insofar as solidarity is the goal. Continuous sentimental education is enough, and has the added 
advantage of avoiding the problem of specifying when exactly solidarity has been attained. 
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For a greater justice to come about, suitable conditions need to be created through an expansion of 
‘logical space’ (Rorty, 1998c, p. 204). This requires the eliciting of new reactions to old situations—for 
people to feel ‘revulsion and rage where once they felt indifference and resignation’ (Rorty, 1998c). ‘New 
reactions’ are evoked through ‘new language’ (1998c), ‘unfamiliar noises’ (Rorty, 1991b, pp. 162–172)—
expanding our linguistic repertoires. New uses of words are further able to have a ‘psychological’ effect 
on us, rather than just a ‘logical’ one (Rorty, 1991b, pp. 170–172). Apart from the emotional effect new 
language/noises/metaphors can have, it gives us the vocabulary to grasp where and how we have been 
cruel and oppressive so that we can ‘modify our practices’ (Rorty, 1998c, p. 206). We can understand our 
oppression as having disappeared when the oppressed achieve full personhood in everyone's eyes. ‘For to 
be a fully-fledged person in a given society is a matter of double negation: it is not to think of oneself as 
belonging to a group that powerful people in that society thank God they do not belong to’ (Rorty, 1998c, 
p. 224). Pragmatists like Rorty are unable to claim that oppressed persons are always ‘full-fledged’, 
because pragmatists see ‘personhood as a matter of degree, not as an all-or-nothing affair’ (Rorty, 1998c, 
p. 219). The understanding we have of oppressed/poor people tends to be qualitatively inferior to what we 
have of the wealthy and powerful. This is not to argue that the world's poor fit naturally into this category. 
It is to say that they lack the language and forums in which to express the injustice they suffer through a 
fuller description of what it is like to be them, thereby reminding us of our responsibility towards them. 
Continuous sentimental education can heighten the concern for outsiders who are suffering, lessen our 
objectification of them and shift the targets of our beneficence towards those facing life-threatening 
poverty. 
 
Conclusion 
Rorty’s endorsement of a form of the self (the liberal ironist) and a form of society (liberal society) that 
are strongly oriented toward suffering and excluded people promises increased concern for the world's 
poorest people. However, it was claimed in this article that these progressive ambitions and promises are 
constrained by certain elements of Rorty’s approach. These constraints include Rorty’s unquestioned 
statism and his focus on internal outsiders who are suffering and/or oppressed, instead of external 
outsiders beyond national borders; Rorty’s insistence upon a public-private split that ‘legitimises’ social 
indifference, coupled with a narrow understanding of responsibility; the undemandingness of his 
liberalism; and his emphasis on the excluding notion of ‘solidarity’, as prerequisite for moral concern. 
However, sentimental education offers the hope of decreased objectification of and indifference to the 
global poor and the possibility of making us more aware of the oppression and usurpation of our 
seemingly justified existence, thereby leading to a greater concern and engagement with the plight of the 
world's poorest. 
Notes 
1.  While Rorty appears to disdain cosmopolitan ‘Platonism’, he hopes for a ‘global, cosmopolitan, 
democratic, egalitarian, classless, casteless society’ (1999, p. xii). 
2.  On Rorty and international relations, see Cochran (1996, 1999), and a Special Issue of Millennium: 
Journal of International Studies devoted to pragmatism and international relations theory (2002). On 
the cosmopolitan-communitarian debate, see Brown (1992, 2002). 
3.  For criticism of the ‘intellectual vacuity’ of this definition of a liberal, see Kekes (1996, p. 74). 
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4.  For a critique, see Putnam (2000, p. 63). 
5.  For an associated criticism, see Pogge (2002, p. 7). 
6.  For similar criticism, see McCarthy (1990, p. 187). 
7.  Rorty does say that the predicament of the suffering must be put ‘into language’ (1989, p. 94). It must 
be said that Rorty is scornful of a lack of political engagement, deriding the ‘Foucauldian left’ in 
America for being too ‘busy unmasking the present that they have no time to discuss what laws need 
to be passed in order to create a better future’ (1998a, p. 139). 
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